ODRL is a popular XML-based language for stating the conditions under which resources can be accessed legitimately. The language is described in English and, as a result, agreements written in ODRL are open to interpretation. To address this problem, we propose a formal semantics for a representative fragment of the language. We use this semantics to determine precisely when a permission is implied by a set of ODRL statements and show that answering such questions is a decidable NP-hard problem. Finally, we de ne a tractable fragment of ODRL that is also fairly expressive.
Introduction
ODRL, the Open Digital Rights Language [Iannella 2002] , is an XML-based language for stating the conditions under which resources can be accessed legitimately. For example, in ODRL, an author can write \Anyone who pays ve dollars may download my latest eBook 'How to Get Rich in Five Dollar Increments' ". As another example, Pixar can say \The Disney Corp. has the exclusive right to distribute the movie 'Finding Nemo' ". Although there are many languages that can capture these types of statements, ODRL is particularly interesting because it has been endorsed by nearly twenty organizations including Nokia, a multi-industry conglomerate focused on mobile communications; the DAFNE project (District Architecture for Networked Editions), a research project funded by the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research to develop a prototype of the national infrastructure for electronic publishing in Italy; the RoMEO Project (Rights MEtadata for Open archiving), created to investigate rights management of \self-archived" research in the United Kingdom academic community.
ODRL developers are currently working with a number of communities, including Creative Commons and Dublin Core, to address their needs. The complete list of supporters and ongoing projects can be found at www.odrl.net; however, this small sample already illustrates Most of this work was done while the rst author was at Cornell University. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS'04), 2004. the widespread impact that ODRL has on rights management. The success of these projects depends on ODRL.
Unfortunately, ODRL does not have formal semantics. The meaning of the statements is described in English and, as a result, agreements written in ODRL are open to interpretation. For example, suppose that Alice owns two printers, Printer One and Printer Two, and Bob is a potential user. To regulate Bob's access to the printers, Alice and Bob write an agreement in ODRL that says only this: Bob is permitted to use Printer One or Bob is permitted to use Printer Two. The agreement clearly allows Bob to use at least one of the printers, but it does not say which one. If Alice assumes the choice is hers, since the agreement does not say otherwise, and Bob believes the choice is his, since the agreement arguably implies this, then Alice and Bob disagree on the meaning of the agreement. Moreover, because this type of underspeci cation is possible in ODRL, they cannot use the ODRL speci cation to resolve the dispute.
To address this problem, we propose a formal semantics for ODRL and de ne when a permission (or prohibition) follows from a set of ODRL statements. To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to do this. When giving the language formal semantics, we had to resolve the ambiguities in the speci cation. Most of the aspects were clari ed through discussions with Renato Iannella, editor of the ODRL speci cation and Chief Scientist at IPR systems at the time of its release. Unfortunately, he could not answer all of our questions because some of them revealed subtleties in the language that had not been considered previously. While discovering such subtleties is one of the rewards for trying to give a language formal semantics, these issues must be resolved before semantics can be given. So, when necessary, we have highlighted ambiguities and then taken our best guess.
We give formal semantics to ODRL by de ning a translation from the key components in ODRL to formulas in a fragment of many-sorted rst-order logic with equality. We use rst-order logic because the formal methods community has proposed several policy languages that are fragments of rst-order logic (see, for example, Cassandra [Becker and Sewell 2004] , Lithium [Halpern and Weissman 2003 ], Delegation Logic [Li et al. 2003 ], the RT (Role-based Trust-management) framework [Li et al. 2002] , Binder [DeTreville 2002 ], SD3 [Jim 2001] , and FAF (Flexible Authorization Framework) [Jajodia et al. 2001] ), and a translation exists for XrML [Halpern and Weissman 2004] , another popular XML-based language. So the translation from ODRL to rst-order logic facilitates comparisons between the languages and helps us apply previous results to ODRL. In addition, because rst-order logic is highly expressive, we are hopeful that, if ODRL is extended, then the translation can be extended in a natural way.
The formal semantics can be used as a foundation for answering queries. For example, answering a query of the form \Does a particular permission (or prohibition) follow from a set of ODRL statements" corresponds to deciding whether the translation of the statements implies the permission (or prohibition). Answering this particular type of query is of obvious practical importance. Unfortunately, we show that the problem is NP-hard. The intractability result is due, at least in part, to a component that is not clearly de ned in the speci cation and seems to require further consideration by the language developers. If we remove this troublesome construct, then we can answer our queries in polynomial time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a representative fragment of ODRL. In Section 3, we give a semantics to this fragment by translating expressions in the language to formulas in rst-order logic. In Section 4, we de ne when a set of ODRL statements imply a permission (or prohibition); show that determining whether a particular implication holds is, in general, NP-hard; and nd a tractable fragment of the language. We give a general critique of ODRL, along with suggested improvements, in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
The ODRL Language
In this section, we describe ODRL by giving an abstract syntax for a representative fragment of the language. Using this abstract syntax, rather than the XML-based syntax of ODRL, simpli es the presentation and discussion of our semantics. To illustrate the di erences between the two notations, consider the statement \If Mary Smith pays ve dollars, then she is allowed to print the eBook 'Treasure Island' twice and she is allowed to display it on her computer as many times as she likes". (A similar expression is discussed in [Guth et al. 2003 ].) We can write the statement in ODRL as <agreement> <asset> <context> <uid> Treasure Island </uid> </context> </asset> <permission> <display> <constraint> <cpu> <context> <uid> Mary's computer </uid> </context> </cpu> </constraint> </display> <print> <constraint> <count> 2 </count> </constraint> </print> <requirement> <prepay> <payment> <amount currency="AUD"> 5.00</amount> </payment> </prepay> </requirement> </permission> <party> <context> <name> Mary Smith </name> </context> </party> </agreement> Our syntax is given in Figures 1 and 2 . We now discuss its main features and then present a summary of the key di erences between our syntax and that of ODRL. The central construct of ODRL is an agreement. An agreement says that a principal (i.e., an agent or a group) prin u is allowed to access an asset according to a set of policies (i.e., rules). Typically, prin u is called the agreement's user. For example, suppose that an agreement says \Alice is allowed to play 'Finding Nemo', if she rst pays ve dollars". Then, the user is Alice, the asset is 'Finding Nemo', and the policy is \The user may play the asset, if she pays ve dollars" The set of principals and assets is application-dependent. For example, a digital library might have a principal for each patron and an asset for each publication. We assume that the application provides a set Assets of assets, as well as a set Subjects of subjects. The set of principals is de ned inductively: every subject in Subjects is a principal and every group (i.e., set) of principals is a principal. Roughly speaking, if a policy applies to a principal prin, then the policy applies to every subject in prin.
Every agreement includes a policy set. A policy set consists of a prerequisite and a policy. Roughly speaking, if the prerequisite holds, then the policy holds; that is, the policy is taken into consideration when answering questions about what is and what is not permitted. In addition, a policy set can be tagged as being exclusive. An exclusive policy set indicates that only the agreement's user (the subjects comprising the principal) may perform the actions regulated by the policy set; every other subject is forbidden from doing the regulated actions. Policy sets are closed under conjunction. Roughly speaking, this allows a single agreement to include multiple policy sets.
A policy is a prerequisite, an action, and a unique identi er. If the prerequisite holds, then the policy says that the agreement's user may perform the action to the agreement's asset. (We use the identi ers to simplify the translation. They are optional in ODRL.) The set of policies is closed under conjunction. For simplicity, we often omit the identi er if it is not relevant to our examples and we restrict the set of actions to play, print, and display. A prerequisite is either true, a constraint, a requirement, or a condition. The prerequisite true always holds. For simplicity, we abbreviate policy sets of the form true ! p as p, and we abbreviate policies of the form true =) act as act. Constraints are facts that are outside the user's in uence. For example, there is nothing that Alice can do to meet the constraint \The user is Bob". Requirements are facts that are typically within the user's power to meet. For example, Alice can meet the requirement \The user has paid ve dollars" by making the payment. Although the distinction between constraints and requirements is not relevant when answering questions about what is and is not permitted, we remark that it is useful for other types of queries. In particular, it provides key information when determining what a principal can do to obtain a permission. Finally, conditions are constraints that must not hold. The statement \The user is not Bob" is an example of a condition.
The set of prerequisites is closed under conjunction, disjunction, and exclusive disjunction (i.e., under and, or, and xor). Conjunction allows a single policy or policy set to have multiple prerequisites. For example, we use conjunction to write the policy \If the user pays one dollar and acknowledges Alice as the creator of le f , then the user may copy f ". Disjunction and exclusive disjunction are used to abbreviate policies and policy sets in a natural way. For example, consider the policy \If the user pays ve dollars then the user may watch the movie and if the user is Alice, then the user may watch the movie". Using disjunction, we can abbreviate the policy as \If the user pays ve dollars or the user is Alice, then the user may watch the movie".
Our fragment of ODRL includes two primitive forms of constraints user constraints and count constraints. A user constraint is a principal prin; a subject s meets the constraint if s 2 prin. A count constraint refers to a set P of policies, and is parameterized by an integer n. The constraint holds if n is greater than the number of times the user of the agreement has invoked the policies in P to justify her actions. If the constraint appears in a policy p, then P = fpg. Otherwise, the constraint appears in some policy set ps and P is the set of policies mentioned in ps. 
The constraint forEachMember takes a principal prin (usually a group) and a list L of constraints; it holds if each principal in prin satis es each constraint in L.
ODRL supports nested constraints, where a constraint is used to modify another constraint. To illustrate how our approach can accommodate nested constraints, we support the constraint prinhcount[n]i, which is interpreted like a count[n] constraint, except that it applies to the principal prin rather than to the user of the agreement. Thus, the constraint holds if n is greater than the number of times prin has used the policies to justify her actions. There are two primitive requirements, prePay and attribution. The prePay requirement takes an amount of money as a parameter; it holds if the user pays the speci ed amount. The attribution requirement takes a subject s as a parameter; it holds if s is properly acknowledged (e.g., as the writer, producer, etc.). The set of requirements is closed under the inSeq construct, which says the requirements must be met in a particular order (e.g., acknowledge, then pay), and under the anySeq construct, which says the requirements can be met in any order.
Finally mean that a policy set (or, in particular, a policy) does not hold? Consider the policy \If Alice pays ve dollars, then she is permitted to play 'Finding Nemo' ". There are at least two reasonable interpretations of when the policy does not hold. Under the rst interpretation, the policy does not hold if Alice cannot get the permission by paying ve dollars. In other words, we could interpret not[ps] to mean that a certain set of agreements does not imply ps. A problem with this interpretation is that we do not know which agreements should be used to evaluate the condition. Under the second interpretation, which we favor, the policy does not hold if Alice has paid ve dollars and is not permitted to play the movie. In other words, the condition amounts to the logical negation of the policy. We choose this interpretation because it is simple, fairly intuitive, and, as we shall see, leads to semantics that matches the semantics for negated constraints. (This is encouraging because, in the ODRL speci cation, the discussion of negated policy sets is essentially identical to the discussion of negated constraints.) 1 Example 2.5. Consider the following agreement:
1 It is worth noting that we could modify our interpretation without contradicting the speci cation. Continuing with our example, one variation is to have the condition hold if Alice paid ve dollars and is not explicitly permitted to play the movie. Another variation is to have the condition hold if Alice paid ve dollars and is explicitly forbidden to play the movie. We could modify our semantics to accommodate the variations in a fairly straightforward way. (This can be accomplished with a validity operator; see [Halpern and Weissman 2004] The agreement says that Alice and Bob may each display the asset ebook up to ve times, and they may each print it once. However, the total number of actions, either displays or prints, done by Alice and Bob may be at most ten. The agreement says that after paying ve dollars and then acknowledging Charlie, Alice is permitted to play the asset latestJingle up to ten times. Moreover, any subject that is neither Alice nor Bob is forbidden from playing latestJingle. (Bob's right is unregulated.)
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the syntax presented here di ers from the one described in the ODRL speci cation. The key di erences are discussed below.
Authorship. An ODRL agreement includes a principal called the owner. Roughly speaking, the owner is the principal who is granting the permissions that are mentioned in the agreement. While this information can be useful in practice (e.g., for auditing), our syntax does not mention the owner of an agreement because the identity of the owner does not a ect the legitimacy of an ODRL agreement|an agreement holds regardless of who created it.
O ers. In addition to agreements, ODRL includes o ers, which are essentially agreements without users. Intuitively, an o er is a contract (governing the use of an asset) that does not apply until it is accepted by a user; once accepted, it becomes an agreement. We can interpret o ers much as we do agreements.
Permissions versus Policies. The ODRL speci cation uses the term permission to refer to actions, policies, and policy sets, as de ned here. We introduce the distinction to clarify the exposition and to emphasize the two-tier structure of ODRL. Notice that it is the two layers in the framework that allow a prerequisite to apply to multiple policies.
Contexts. ODRL uses contexts to assign additional information to agreements, prerequisites, and other entities. A context might include a unique identi er, a human-readable name, an expiration date, and so on. We represent the context elements that are included in our fragment directly in the syntax. Adding full contexts to our syntax is straightforward, but it does not add any insight. Moreover, we believe it obfuscates the main issues.
Prerequisites. Payments and other requirements in ODRL take a number of arguments. For instance, payments can take an amount and a percentage to be collected for taxes. We restrict every prerequisite to at most one argument for simplicity; it is easy to extend our approach to include multiple arguments. As we have already mentioned, ODRL supports nested constraints. These can be handled in a manner similar to that used for prinhcount[n]i.
Sequences and Containers. In ODRL, sequences (inSeq, anySeq) and containers (and, or, xor) apply to a number of entities. For simplicity, we associate the three containers with prerequisites, and associate sequences with requirements. The general case is a straightforward extension. In particular, the extension of containers to policies in the obvious way helps resolve the ambiguity discussed in the introduction; the policy \Bob may use Printer One or Bob may use Printer Two" gives Bob the right to use either printer as he chooses. According to discussions with Renato Iannella, this is the interpretation intended by the language developers.
Right Holders. In ODRL, right holders have a royalty annotation, indicating the amount of royalty that they receive. This does not re ect an obligation on the part of the agreement's user, since payment obligations are captured by requirements. Instead, the annotations record how the payments are distributed. Since we are primarily interested in capturing permissions, we do not consider royalty annotations, and as a result, do not distinguish right holders from other principals.
Revocation. Finally, the ODRL speci cation mentions revocation, however it is not clearly de ned. A revocation invalidates a previously established agreement. Unfortunately, answers to key questions, such as who can revoke an agreement, under what conditions, and subject to what penalties, are not discussed in the ODRL speci cation. As it stands, a revocation simply indicates that an agreement has been nulli ed, and thus may be ignored.
A Semantics in First-Order Logic
In this section, we formalize the intuitive description of ODRL given in Section 2. Specically, we present a translation from agreements to formulas in many-sorted rst-order logic with equality. For the rest of this discussion, we assume knowledge of many-sorted rstorder logic at the level of Enderton [1972] . More speci cally, we assume familiarity with the syntax of rst-order logic, including constants, variables, predicate symbols, function symbols, and quanti cation, with the semantics of rst-order logic, including relational models and valuations, and with the notion of satis ability and validity of rst-order formulas.
We assume sorts Actions, Subjects, Assets, PolIds, and SetPolIds (for sets of policy identi ers), and deliberately identify a sort with the set of values of that sort. We further assume sorts Reals and Times; Real to represent real numbers, and Times to represent time. We interpret real numbers in the standard way. For simplicity, we take sort Times to be the nonnegative real numbers extended with the special constant 1 representing in nity. Again, we interpret such extended nonnegative real numbers in the standard way; in particular, t < 1 for every nonnegative real number t di erent from 1.
The vocabulary includes:
A predicate Permitted on Subjects Actions Assets. The literal Permitted(s; act ; a) means s is permitted to perform action act on asset a.
A predicate Paid on Reals SetPolIds Time. The literal Paid(r; I; t) means an amount r was paid towards the policies corresponding to the set I of policy identi ers at time t.
A predicate Attributed on Subjects Time. The literal Attributed(s; t) means s was acknowledged at time t.
Constants of sort PolIds, SetPolIds, Subjects, and Assets; we also assume constants play , display , and print of sort Actions.
A function count : Subjects PolIds ! Reals. Intuitively, count(s; id ) is the number of times subject s used the policy with identi er id to justify an action.
Standard functions for addition (+) and comparison (<; ) of real numbers and extended real numbers.
Before presenting the translation, we de ne some useful auxiliary functions. The function subjects returns the set all subjects appearing in a principal:
The function principals returns the set of principals that are members of a given principal; if the principal is a subject, the function returns the singleton set consisting of that subject:
principals (fprin 1 ; : : : ; prin k g) , fprin 1 ; : : : ; prin k g:
The function ids takes a policy p, and returns the set of policy identi ers that are mentioned in p:
ids(pr 1 : : : pr m =) id act) , fid g ids(and[p 1 ; : :
The translation proceeds by induction on the structure of the agreement. The translation is given in Figures 3 and 4 ; we discuss its key features below.
An agreement is translated into a conjunction of formulas of the form:
where P (x) is itself a conjunction of formulas of the form
and x is a variable of sort Subjects that is free in P (x). (The notation (:)Permitted( ) indicates that the formula Permitted( ) might be negated.) The translation of a policy set ps is a formula [[ps] ] prin u ;a , where prin u is the agreement's user and a is the asset. A (nonexclusive) primitive policy set prq ! p translates to an implication: if the user is in prin u and the prerequisite holds, then the policy holds. An exclusive primitive policy set is translated as a nonexclusive primitive policy set in conjunction with a clause that captures the prohibition (i.e., every subject that is not 
;a x V m i=1 f i is true when m = 0.) Note that the translation of a policy set is de ned in terms of a check that the user is in prin u , the translation of a policy, and the translation of a prerequisite. We now consider each of these in turn. The formula [[prin] ] x is true if and only if the subject denoted by the variable x is in the principal prin.
There are two translations for policies: a positive translation, where the permissions described by a policy are granted, and a negative translation, where they are forbidden. The positive translation of a policy p is a formula
, where prin u is the user of the agreement, a is the asset, and x is the variable that ranges over the subjects. A policy of the form prq =) act translates to an implication: if the prerequisite holds, then the subject represented by x is permitted to perform the action act on the asset a. The negative translation of a policy p is a formula [[p]] ;a x , where a is the asset, and x is the variable that ranges over the subjects. If p is prq =) act, then the translation says that x is forbidden to do act to a, regardless of whether prq holds. The positive and negative translations of policies are de ned in terms of the translation of actions, which is simply the constant corresponding to the action. As with policy sets, conjunctions of policies translate to conjunctions of the corresponding formulas.
The translation of a prerequisite prq is a formula [[prq ]] I;prin;a x , where I is a set of policy identi ers, prin is a principal, a is an asset, and x is a variable of sort Subjects. Intuitively, 
Figure 4: Translation of ODRL prerequisites I includes (the identi er of) the policies that are implied by the prerequisites and prin is the principal to which the prerequisites apply (the agreement's user, unless overridden within a forEachMember constraint). A Boolean combination of prerequisites translates to the Boolean combination of the formulas obtained by translating each prerequisite in turn. A user constraint prin translates to a formula that is true if the current subject x is a member of prin. The translation of the other constraints is more complicated. A forEachMember constraint translates to a formula that is true if, intuitively, each constraint in forEachMember is met by each subject mentioned in the constraint (i.e., each member). A constraint count[n] translates to a formula that is true if the subjects mentioned in prin u have invoked the policies identi ed in I a total of i times where i is less than n. Similarly, a prinhcount[n]i constraint translates to a formula that is true if the total number of times that a subject in prin has invoked a policy whose identi er is in I is less than n. Conditions are translated by negating the translation of either the policy set or the constraint speci ed as the argument. Recall that, in ODRL, we can capture statements such as \If Alice is not permitted to print the report, then she is permitted to display it". We can also write \If Alice is permitted to print the report, then she is permitted to display it", since xor[true; not [ps] ] is equivalent to ps. It follows from our semantics that the rst statement alone gives Alice the display permission if she is explicitly forbidden to print the report; the two statements together imply that Alice may display the report, regardless of which print permissions are granted or denied.
Another subtlety arises in the interpretation of sequence requirements, particularly nested sequence requirements. 
where S k is the set of all permutations of sets of k elements. Our translation is admittedly complex, however it is not clear that a more simple translation is possible due to the distributed nature of agreements (e.g., a count constraint can implicitly refer to policy identi ers that occur throughout the enclosing policy set). To conclude this section, we translate Examples 2.5 and 2.6 from Section 2. translates to the formula 8x((x = Alice _ x = Bob) ) count (Alice; id 1 ) + count(Alice; id 2 ) + count(Bob; id 1 ) + count(Bob; id 2 ) 10 ) ((count (Alice; id 1 ) < 5^count (Bob; id 1 ) < 5) ) Permitted(x; display ; ebook ))( (count (Alice; id 2 ) < 1^count (Bob; id 2 ) < 1) )
Permitted(x; print ; ebook ))): translates to the formula 8x((x = Alice _ x = Bob) ) 9t 1 9t 2 (t 1 < t 2^P aid(5:00; t 1 )^Attributed(Charlie; t 2 )) ) (x = Alice^count(Alice; id ) < 10 ) Permitted(x; play ; latestJingle))( :(x = Alice _ x = Bob) ) :Permitted(x; play ; latestJingle))):
These examples illustrate that, despite the complexity of the translation, the structure of formulas obtained from the translation follows closely that of the agreements.
Queries
Our formal semantics provides a foundation for reasoning about agreements in a rigorous way. Because of their obvious usefulness, we focus on queries of the form \may subject s do action act to asset a". In this section, we formally de ne such queries; then we examine the complexity of answering them.
Formal De nition
Whether a permission (or prohibition) holds depends on the agreements that have been created, as well as certain facts about the application. For our fragment of ODRL, the relevant facts are which payments have been made, which acknowledgments have been given, and the number of times each policy has been used to justify an action. We encode this information in an environment, which is a conjunction of positive ground literals, each of the form Attributed(s; t) or Paid(s; I; t), and equalities of the form count(s; id ) = n. Based on the type of information stored in the environment (both for our fragment and for all of ODRL), it seems reasonable to make a form of closed-world assumption: we assume all environment facts are known. That is, if a positive Permitted-free ground literal is not a conjunct of the environment then we assume it does not hold, with two exceptions. First, if there is a subject s and policy identi er id such that no conjunct of E has the form count(s; id ) = n, then we assume count (s; id ) = 0. Second, if the environment together with the standard interpretation of =, <, and imply that a positive literal holds, then we assume that it does. For example, if s and s 0 are subjects; id and id 0 are policy identi ers; and no conjunct of E has the form count(s; id ) = n or count (s 0 ; id 0 ) = n, then we assume count(s; id ) = 0, count(s 0 ; id 0 ) = 0, and count (s; id ) = count (s 0 ; id 0 ). Suppose that we are interested in determining whether a set A of agreements imply that a subject s may do action act to asset a in environment E. We represent such a query as a tuple (A; s; act; a; E). Answering the query corresponds to establishing the validity of a formula with respect to a particular class of models. Recall that a Herbrand model is a model whose domain consists of the closed terms in the language. We are interested only in Herbrand models that agree with the environment and that interpret the symbols =, <, and in the standard way; that is, they satisfy the axioms of real closed elds [Tarski 1951 ] over the sorts Reals and Times|in the latter case, the axioms extended with the obvious axioms to deal with 1. These axioms include, for instance, the re exivity of equality, 8x:(x = x), and the monotonicity of addition, 8x; y; z:(x y ) x + z y + z). Moreover, we want the models to enforce the closed-world assumption on environments. Given an environment E, let F(E) be the set of formulas made up of E itself, the real closed elds axioms (extended to deal with 1), and formulas count(s; id ) = 0 for every subject s and policy identi er id such that count(s; id ) is not a conjunct of E. Intuitively, these are the formulas directly \implied" by the environment. Given a query q = (A; s; act ; a; E), de ne a model M to be E-relevant if:
(1) the domain of M consists of the closed terms in the language;
(2) M satis es every formula in F(E); (3) for every positive Permitted-free ground literal ' that holds in M , the model M 0 that is identical to M except that it does not satisfy ' does not satisfy every formula in F(E).
Because an environment consists only of positive facts, an environment E is inconsistent if and only if E has two conjuncts count (s; id ) = n 1 and count(s; id ) = n 2 with n 1 6 = n 2 . Thus, an environment E is consistent if and only if there exists an E-relevant model. When evaluating a query q = (A; s; act ; a; E), we consider only those models that are E-relevant. A formula is E-valid if it holds in every E-relevant model. We now have the necessary foundation to give an answer to a query q = (A; s; act ; a; E). De ne the formulas:
The answer to the query depends on the E-validity of f + q and f q .
If both f + q and f q are E-valid, then either the environment is inconsistent, in which case all formulas are E-valid, or the agreements are inconsistent in the environment. Either way, an appropriate answer to the query seems to be \Query inconsistent".
If f +
q is E-valid and f q is not, the answer is \Permission granted" because, roughly speaking, the permission necessarily follows from the agreements in the given environment.
Similarly, if f q is E-valid and f + q is not, then the answer is \Permission denied".
Finally, if neither f + q nor f q is valid, then the agreements in the given environment do not imply that the permission is granted, nor do they imply that the permission is denied. So the answer is \Permission unregulated".
Complexity
We now consider the computational complexity of answering queries. It turns out that we can create an algorithm that takes a query and returns the correct answer; however, it seems unlikely that any algorithm will run e ciently on all input. The relevant result is the following.
Theorem 4.1. The problem of deciding, for a query q = (A; s; act ; a; E), whether f + q is E-valid is decidable and NP-hard. Similarly, the problem of deciding, for a query q = (A; s; act ; a; E), whether f q is E-valid is decidable.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Since answering a query q amounts to determining the E-validity of f + q and f q , the rst of which cannot be done e ciently, answering a query cannot be done e ciently.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 in Appendix A suggests that the intractability result holds, at least in part, because ODRL includes conditions of the form not [ps] , where ps is a policy set. It might be possible to modify our translation, and thus the meaning, of not[ps] in such a way that the revised semantics matches the speci cation and answering queries in the revised language is a tractable (i.e., solvable in polynomial time) problem. This is because, as discussed in Section 2, the description of not [ps] in the ODRL speci cation is open to interpretation. However, tweaking the semantics to get a desired complexity result seems somewhat dubious. In addition, it is not clear that nding the largest tractable fragment of ODRL, as we have interpreted the language, is interesting because, having discovered that a component of the language is not clearly speci ed and a natural interpretation leads to intractability, it seems likely that the meaning of that component will be revised. Since we cannot know beforehand what the revision will be, we restrict our attention to the fragment of ODRL that does not include conditions of the form not [ps] .
Let Q 1 be the set of queries (A; s; act ; a; E) such that no agreement in A mentions a prerequisite of the form not [ps] . We now show that we can answer a query q = (A; s; act ; a; E) in Q 1 e ciently. As a rst step, we consider the special case in which the set of agreements is a singleton. For any expression e (either in our ODRL syntax or in rst-order logic), let jej be the length of e when viewed as a string of symbols. For a set A of agreements, let jAj be agr 2A jagr j.
Lemma 4.2. There are algorithms that, given a query q = (fagr g; s; act ; a; E) in Q 1 : (a) determine whether f + q is E-valid in time O(jEj jagr j 6 ), and (b) determine whether f q is E-valid in time O(jEj + jagr j).
It follows from Lemma 4.2 that Q 1 is tractable, provided that a permission (or prohibition) follows from a set of agreements if and only if it follows from a single agreement in the set. Unfortunately, this is not necessarily true. Observe that agr gives Alice permission to print the le and agr 0 forbids Alice from printing it, since the agreement gives Bob the right exclusively. Because the agreements contradict each other, f + q and f q are E-valid for all queries q = (A; s; act ; a; E). So the answer to the query (A; Charlie; print; le; E) is \Query inconsistent", whereas the answer to the query (fagr g; Charlie; print; le; E) and to the query (fagr 0 g; Charlie; print; le; E) is \Permission unregulated".
If we consider only those queries in Q 1 for which the set of agreements holds in at least one relevant model, then we get the desired results.
Lemma 4.4. Suppose that q = (A; s; act ; a; E) is a query in Q 1 such that
] is satis ed in at least one E-relevant model. For every agr 2 A, let q agr be the query (fagr g; s; act ; a; E). Then:
q is E-valid if and only if f + qagr is E-valid for some agr 2 A and (b) f q is E-valid if and only if f qagr is E-valid for some agr 2 A.
It follows from Lemma 4.2 and 4.4 together that answering a query q = (A; s; act ; a; E) Q 1 can be done e ciently, provided that V agr 2A [[agr ] ] is satis ed in at least one E-relevant model. Moreover, if this is not the case, then the query can be answered immediately. If
] does not hold in any E-relevant model then both f + q and f q are E-valid, so the answer to q is \Query inconsistent". Therefore, we can answer queries in Q 1 e ciently provided we can quickly determine whether the agreements are satis ed in at least one relevant model. Lemma 4.5. There is an algorithm that, given a query q = (A; s; act ; a; E) in Q 1 , determines whether V agr 2A [[agr ] ] is satis ed in at least one E-relevant model in time O(jEj jAj 8 ).
Putting all of these results together, we can derive the tractability of answering queries in Q 1 . Theorem 4.6. There is an algorithm that, given a query q = (A; s; act ; a; E) in Q 1 , computes the answer to q in time O(jEj jAj 8 ).
Proof. First, run the algorithm of Lemma 4.5 to determine if
] is satis ed in at least one E-relevant model. This can be done in time O(jEj jAj 8 ). If the result is \No", then return \Query inconsistent". If the result is \Yes", then use the algorithms of Lemma 4.2 to check whether f + qagr and f qagr are E-valid for each query q = (fagr g; s; act ; a; E) such that agr 2 A. This can be done in time O(jEj jAj 7 ): there are less than jAj agreements in A, and for every agr 2 A, jagr j jAj. By Lemma 4.4, f + q is E-valid if and only if f qarg is E-valid for an agr 2 A, and similarly for f q . Thus, if f + qarg is E-valid for an agr 2 A, and f qarg is not E-valid for all agr 2 A, then return \Permission granted". Similarly, if f qarg is E-valid for an agr 2 A, and f + qarg is not E-valid for all agr 2 A, then return \Permission denied". Otherwise, return \Permission unregulated".
We conclude this section with a few observations. First, we suspect that the queries that are of practical interest have certain properties that could be used to improve the e ciency of our algorithms. For example, it seems unlikely that a set of agreements will give one principal an exclusive right and give someone else that same right (possibly under certain conditions). That is, if A is a set of agreements such that an agreement in A gives a principal prin the exclusive-right to do an action act to an asset a and another agreement in A gives a principal prin 0 the right to do act to a if certain prerequisites hold, then we expect that subjects(prin 0 ) subjects(prin). A straightforward syntactic check can be used to verify that this is indeed the case for a particular query and, if it is, then our proof of Theorem 4.5 can be easily modi ed to show that we can do the check in time O(jEj).
We conjecture that answering a query (A; s; act ; a; E) in ODRL can be done e ciently, provided that, if an agreement in A mentions a prerequisite of the form xor[prq 1 ; : : : ; prq n ], then prq i does not mention a prerequisite of the form not [ps] , where ps is a policy set, for i = 1; : : : ; n. That is, we suspect that answering queries can be done e ciently provided that, whether a permission holds, does not depend on whether a policy set holds (although it can depend on whether a policy set does not hold). We believe that we can use ideas discussed in [Halpern and Weissman 2003] to prove this result, however, we have not checked the details because, as previously discussed, it is not clear that such a result is of practical interest.
Discussion: Improving ODRL
The process of working through the ODRL speci cation to derive the formal semantics highlighted a number of potential weaknesses in the design of ODRL. In addition to not having formal semantics, the ODRL speci cation does not discuss which agreements should be enforced, how con icts should be resolved, how agreements can be revoked, and how the environment can be maintained. We examine these issues in turn.
The ODRL speci cation does not say which agreements should be used when evaluating requests. The developers seem to assume that only a legitimate agent will be able to create a particular agreement; however, it is not clear which agents should be recognized as legitimate. Are there ODRL agreements that give subjects the right to create agreements? If so, who is allowed to write those agreements? A natural approach is simply to assume that everyone can write agreements; it is up to the enforcing system to determine which are legitimate. A problem with this design is that an agreement might be meaningless on some systems and quite signi cant on others. For example, suppose that Bob stores his diary on his home machine, which assumes all agreements are legitimate, and on his work machine, which assumes an agreement is only legitimate if written by a manager of the company. If Bob's sister Alice, who is not a manager of the company, writes an agreement that gives her permission to see Bob's diary, then the home machine will permit the access while the work machine will not.
A more satisfying approach is to de ne the circumstances under which an agreement is legitimate and require only legitimate agreements to be considered during query evaluation. A de nition for legitimacy might say that some agreements are legitimate by at (e.g., any agreement about an asset a issued by its owner), while others are legitimate because there is some proof of legitimacy (e.g., an agreement about an asset a issued by subject s is legitimate, because the owner of a has written an agreement that gives s permission to regulate access to a). This is essentially the approach adopted for XrML [ContentGuard 2001] .
The ODRL speci cation does not discuss how con icts should be resolved. For example, suppose that Alice gives Bob the exclusive right to distribute her movie and she gives Charlie the right to distribute it as well. Is Charlie allowed to distribute the movie? By the de nition given in Section 4, the answer is \Query inconsistent" because the agreements are inconsistent in the environment (regardless of what the environment is). While this is an accurate description of the situation, it is not particularly helpful. One solution is to remove exclusive policy sets from the language, so that con icts cannot occur. Another option is to store agreements with the relevant asset, rather than only with the users; that way, con icts can be detected, and hopefully resolved between the relevant parties, as soon as a con icting agreement is written. Finally, it is worth noting that, in languages such as XACML [Moses 2005 ] and FAF [Jajodia et al. 2001] , con icts are handled by requiring users to write overriding policies, such as \If an action is both permitted and forbidden, then it is forbidden". Unfortunately, it is not exactly clear how this solution could be incorporated into the ODRL framework.
The ODRL speci cation discusses revocation, but does not give a mechanism for revoking agreements or for checking whether an agreement has been revoked. Since prerequisites in ODRL can limit the time period in which a policy applies and the number of times the policy can be used to justify an action, it is not clear that revocation is truly necessary. Therefore, one solution is simply to remove all mention of revocation from the ODRL speci cation. Another option is to create policies under which an agreement can be revoked legitimately. These policies could be part of an agreement, or could be built-in to ODRL. The environment could then maintain a list of revoked agreements, which would not be used when answering queries.
Finally, the speci cation does not discuss how the environment is maintained. Holzer, Katzenbeisser, and Schallhart [2004] propose a solution to this problem. They associate with every ODRL agreement an automaton that transitions whenever the user of an agreement performs an action. Thus, to recast their work using our terminology, the states of the automaton corresponding to an agreement are what we call environments. Holzer et al. do not describe how to compute which actions are allowed in any given environment, however, they describe how to update the environment. In contrast, we do not describe how to update environments, but our semantics describes how to compute which actions are permitted in any given environment. In this sense, the two semantics are complementary.
Conclusion
ODRL is a popular rights language with features that we have not found in other approaches. However, the usefulness of ODRL is limited, in part, because the language does not have formal semantics. To address this de ciency, we have proposed a formal semantics for ODRL. In the process of creating this semantics, we discovered aspects of the speci cation that should be clari ed and have discussed our ndings with the language developers. They are currently working on the next version of the language, which has formal semantics as one of its seven design requirements.
In addition to giving the language formal semantics, we have considered the practical problem of determining whether a set of ODRL statements imply a permission or prohibition. Using our semantics, we have formally de ned the problem and shown that it is, in general, NP-hard. By removing a component of ODRL whose meaning seems to be somewhat unclear, even to the developers, we can create a tractable fragment of the language. To prove that the fragment is tractable, we naturally created a polynomial-time algorithm to determine whether a set of ODRL statements imply a permission (or prohibition). To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst algorithm for answering such queries in ODRL.
Despite these successes, the work is far from done. We are currently collaborating with the language developers on the next version of ODRL. We are also interested in examining other types of queries, such as what, if anything, can a subject do to get a desired permission. Finally, we intend to do a careful comparison of ODRL and a number of other languages in the near future.
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A Proofs
In the proofs below, we use the notation C(S) for the cardinality of set S. We also use the notation f [t=x] for the capture-avoiding substitution of term t for variable x in formula f .
Proof. To prove decidability, we present an algorithm to determine whether f + q is E-valid. The rst step of the algorithm is to check if E is inconsistent, by simply scanning E. (Recall that E is inconsistent if and only if E has two conjuncts of the form count (s; id ) = n and count(s; id ) = n 0 with n 6 = n 0 .) If E is inconsistent, then there are no E-relevant models, f + q is trivially E-valid, and the algorithm returns \Yes". If E is consistent, then the set of E-relevant models is not empty, and the algorithm proceeds as follows. Let g be the formula obtained from f + q by replacing every subformula of the form 8x(h) by V s2S (h[s=x] ) and every subformula of the form 9x(h) by
, where S is the set of variable-free terms mentioned in q that are the same sort as x. We claim that f + q is E-valid if and only if g is E-valid. We prove this claim by progressively constructing g; during this process, we consider in some detail the subformulas of the form 8x(h) and 9x(h) that can appear in f + q .
Let g 0 be the formula obtained from f + q by replacing every subformula of the form
where S is the set of variable-free terms of sort Subjects mentioned in q. Since fs 1 ; : : : ; s n g S, it is easy to see that f + q is E-valid if and only if g 0 is E-valid.
Let be the set of substitutions such that, for all variables t of sort Times in g 0 , (t) is a variable-free term of sort Times that appears in q and, for all other variables x, (x) = x. Note that is nite. Let g 1 be the formula obtained from g 0 by replacing every formula of the form 9t 1 : : : 9t n (h), where every free variable of h is of sort Times, with W 2 (h ). It follows from the translation that, if t is a free variable in h, then h is a conjunction of formulas and one of those conjuncts has either the form Paid(r; I; t) or the form Attributed(s; t). It follows from the closed-world assumption that g 0 is E-valid if and only if g 1 is E-valid.
It follows from the translation that every variable remaining in g 1 is of sort Subjects; g 1 includes a subformula of the form 8x(h) if and only if h can be written as x 6 = s 1^: : :^x 6 = s n ) :Permitted(x; act 0 ; a 0 ), where s i is a variable-free term in q, for i = 1; : : : ; n. Let g 2 be the formula obtained from g 1 by replacing every subformula of the form 8x(h) by
, where S is the set of variable-free terms of sort Subjects mentioned in q. Note that g 2 = g. So, it remains to show that g 1 is E-valid if and only if g 2 is E-valid. The \if" direction is trivial. For the \only if" direction, suppose by way of contradiction that g 1 is E-valid and g 2 is not. Note that g 1 is of the form g 0 1 ) Permitted(s; act; a) and g 2 is of the form g 0 2 ) Permitted(s; act; a) for appropriate formulas g 0 1 and g 0 2 . Since g 2 is not E-valid, there is an E-relevant model M that satis es g 0 2^: Permitted(s; act; a). Let M 0 be the E-relevant model that is identical to M , except that the domain of M 0 is limited to the closed terms that are mentioned in q. It is easy to see that g 0 2 holds in M 0 since the formula holds in M , is variable-free, and mentions only those terms that appear in q. It follows from the construction of g 2 that, because g 0 2 holds in M 0 , g 0 1 holds in M 0 . Since, by construction, M 0 does not satisfy Permitted(s; act; a), M does not satisfy g 1 , which gives us the desired contradiction.
Since g is variable-free, the algorithm proceeds by replacing every Permitted-free literal appearing in g by either true or false depending on E and the standard interpretations of =, < and . Let h be the formula obtained from g by doing this replacement. Clearly, g is E-valid if and only if h is E-valid. Moreover, since Permitted is the only predicate symbol appearing in h, h is E-valid if and only if h is valid. The algorithm determines the validity of h by checking if h holds for all assignments of true or false to the Permitted literals in h (where a positive literal ' is not given the same assignment as :'). Obviously, h is valid if it holds under every substitution and is not valid otherwise.
The same strategy can be used to derive an algorithm that determines the E-validity of f q .
We now reduce the 3-satis ability problem to the problem of determining whether f + q is E-valid for an appropriate query q, thereby showing that the latter problem is NP-hard. Let ' = C 1^: : :^C n be a formula in propositional logic, where each C i is a clause with three disjuncts. Without loss of generality, we assume that no conjunct C i is valid. Let P 1 ; : : : P m be the primitive propositions mentioned in '. We want to determine if ' is satis able. Let s 0 ; : : : ; s m be subjects and let a be an asset. For each conjunct 
Let q be the query (fagr 1 ; : : : ; agr n g; s 0 ; display; a; E), where E is the empty environment (i.e., true). We claim that ' is satis able if and only if f + q is not E-valid. For every assignment A of truth values to P 1 ; : : : ; P m , let M A be the E-relevant model that satis es :Permitted(s i ; print ; a) if and only if A assigns P i to false or s i = 0. It is not hard to show that a truth assignment A satis es a conjunct c i of ' if and only if M A satis es [[agr i ]] . The key observation is that, for each conjunct
where
So, if ' is satis able, then there is a truth assignment A that satis es ', the model M A satis es V agr 2A [[agr ] ]^:Permitted(s 0 ; display ; a), and, thus, f + q is not E-valid. If ' is not satis able then, for every truth assignment A, M A does not satisfy some [[agr i ]], so M A satis es f + q . Let M be the set of models M such that, for all truth assignments A, M 6 = M A . It is not hard to see that every model in M satis es Permitted(s 0 ; display ; a), thereby satisfying f + q . Since every E-relevant model satis es f + q , the formula is E-valid.
The following result is used in Lemmas 4.2 and 4.4.
Lemma A.1. Suppose that f is a Permitted-free formula and E is an environment such that the set of E-relevant models is nonempty. Then f holds in at least one E-relevant model if and only if f is E-valid.
Proof. Follows immediately from the de nitions.
Given a policy set ps, let S + ps be the set of tuples (prq; I; prq 0 ; id ; act 0 ) such that ps mentions the policy set prq ! p or prq 7 ! p, I is the set of policy identi ers appearing in p, and p mentions the policy prq 0 =) id act 0 . Finally, let S ps be the set of actions such that an action act 0 is in S ps if and only if ps mentions an exclusive policy set that mentions a policy of the form prq =) act 0 . Lemma 4.2. There are algorithms that, given a query q = (fagr g; s; act ; a; E) in Q 1 :
(a) determine whether f + q is E-valid in time O(jEj jagr j 6 ), and (b) determine whether f q is E-valid in time O(jEj + jagr j).
Proof. Suppose that agr is an agreement of the form agreement for prin u about a 0 with ps. For part (a), we claim that [[agr ] ] ) Permitted(s; act ; a) is E-valid if and only if the set of E-relevant models is empty, or all of the following conditions hold: is not E-valid. It follows from Lemma A.1 that f does not hold in M because it is Permitted-free (neither prq nor prq 0 mention a policy set), so A.2(b) holds again.
It follows that we can determine the E-validity of [[agr ] ] ) Permitted(s; act; a) by running the following algorithm: determine whether the set of E-relevant models is empty; if so, return \Yes", otherwise check conditions (i), (ii), and (iii); if all hold, then return \Yes", else return \No". The set of E-relevant models is non-empty if and only if E is inconsistent, which can be checked in time O(jEj). We can check whether (i) and (ii) hold in time O(jagr j). We can also compute S + ps in time O(jagr j). Finally, the cardinality of S + ps is less than jagr j. We show that, for each tuple (prq; I; prq 0 ; id ; act ) in S + ps , we can determine whether [[prq Generalizing this idea, we can rewrite, in time O(jprqj), the prerequisite prq to an equivalent prq 0 of size O(jprqj) that does not contain nested forEachMember constraints, and similarly rewrite prq 0 to an equivalent prq 0 0 . We then apply the algorithm given in Figure 5 , called Holds, to prq 0 and prq 0 0 . The algorithm Holds returns true or false; it calls ReqHolds, which is given in Figure 6 , and which returns the earliest time at which a given requirement holds, or false if the requirement never holds. The claim that Holds(prq ; s; I; prin u ; E) = true if and only if [[prq]] I;prin u s is E-valid is established by a straightforward induction on the structure of prq. We can check that the algorithm runs in time O(jEj jagr j 5 ) by solving a simple recurrence equation. (The assumption that there are no nested forEachMember in prq is crucial to obtain this running time; without this assumption, the running time is exponential in the size of the prerequisite.) We leave the straightforward details to the reader. For part (b), we claim that [[agr ] ] ) :Permitted(s; act; a) is E-valid if and only if the set of E-relevant models is empty or all of the following conditions hold: (i) s 6 2 subjects(prin u ),
(ii) a 0 = a, and (iii) agr includes an exclusive policy set that mentions a policy of the form prq ) act.
For the \if" direction, if the set of E-relevant models is empty, then the formula [[agr ] ] ) :Permitted(s; act ; a) is trivially E-valid. If (i), (ii), and (iii) hold then [[agr ] ] can be written as a conjunction of formulas, one of which says that every subject who is not mentioned in prin u is forbidden to do act to a, so [[agr ] ] ) :Permitted(s; act; a) is again E-valid.
For the \only if" direction, suppose that the set of E-relevant models is non-empty. It follows that there is an E-relevant model M such that, for all closed terms t 1 , t 2 , and t 3 of the appropriate sorts, M satis es :Permitted(t 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 ) if and only if t 1 6 2 subjects(prin u ), t 3 = a 0 , and :Permitted(t 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 ) 6 = :Permitted(s; act ; a). We claim that, if (i), (ii), or (iii) does not hold, then [[agr ] ] holds in M and, thus, [[agr ] ] ) :Permitted(s; act; a) is not E-valid. By Lemma A.2, it su ces to show that A.2(a) and A.2(b) hold. Since M satis es Permitted(t 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 ) for all closed terms such that t 1 2 subjects(prin u ), A.2(b) holds. If (i) or (ii) does not hold, then M satis es :Permitted(t 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 ) if and only if t 1 6 2 subjects(prin u ) and t 3 = a 0 . It follows that, for all subjects s 0 6 2 subjects(prin u ) and all actions act 00 2 S ps , M satis es :Permitted(s 0 ; act 00 ; a 0 ); so A.2(a) holds. If (iii) does not hold, then act 6 2 S ps . It follows from the construction of M that, for each action act 00 6 = act and each subject s 0 6 2 subjects(prin u ), M satis es :Permitted(s 0 ; act 00 ; a 0 ), so A.2(b) holds.
Thus, we can determine the E-validity of [[agr ] ] ) :Permitted(s; act; a) by running the following algorithm: determine whether the set of E-relevant models is empty; if so, return \Yes", otherwise check conditions (i), (ii), and (iii); if all hold, then return \Yes", else return \No". Checking that the set of E-relevant models is empty can be done in time O(jEj). Checking conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) can be done in time O(jAj).
Lemma 4.4. Suppose that q = (A; s; act ; a; E) is a query in Q 1 such that V agr 2A [[agr ] ] is satis ed in at least one E-relevant model. For every agr 2 A, let q agr be the query (fagr g; s; act ; a; E). Then: (a) f + q is E-valid if and only if f + qagr is E-valid for some agr 2 A, and (b) f q is E-valid if and only if f qagr is E-valid for some agr 2 A. . Let M 0 be the model that is identical to M except that M 0 satis es :Permitted(s; act ; a). Because M is E-relevant and M 0 differs from M only on the interpretation of Permitted, M 0 is E-relevant. Since M 0 satis es :Permitted(s; act ; a) and, by assumption, V agr 2A [[agr ] ] ) Permitted(s; act; a) is E-valid, there is an agreement agr in A such that M 0 does not satisfy [[agr ] ]. We now show that [[agr ] ] implies Permitted(s; act ; a), which contradicts the assumptions. Because no agreement in A mentions a condition of the form not [ps] , it follows from the translation that we can write [[agr ] ] as 8x(f 1 )^ ^8x(f n ), where each f i is of the form g ) (:)Permitted(x; act 0 ; a 0 ), g is Permitted-free, and both act 0 and a 0 are closed terms of the appropriate sorts. Because [[agr ] ] holds in M and does not hold in M 0 , there exists integer i such that f i = g ) Permitted(x; act ; a) and g[s=x] is satis ed in M 0 . Since g [s=x] is Permitted-free and is satis ed in a E-relevant model, it follows from Lemma A.1 that g[s=x] is E-valid. Putting the pieces together, we can write [[agr ] ] as 8x(h^(g ) Permitted(x; act ; a))), for an appropriate formula h, and g[s=x] is E-valid. It readily follows that [[agr ] ] ) Permitted(s; act; a) is E-valid.
The proof for part (b) is nearly identical to the proof for part (a); in fact, the former can be obtained from the latter by replacing every occurence of Permitted by :Permitted and vice versa.
Lemma 4.5. There is an algorithm that, given a query q = (A; s; act ; a; E) in Q 1 , determines whether V agr 2A [[agr ] ] is satis ed in at least one E-relevant model in time O(jEj jAj 8 ).
Proof. We claim that is not E-valid.
For the \if" direction, observe that if (i) holds, then there is an E-relevant model M such that, for all closed terms t 1 , t 2 , and t 3 of the appropriate sort, M satis es :Permitted(t 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 ) if and only if there is an agreement agr of the form agreement for prin u about a with ps in A such that t 1 6 2 subjects(prin u ), ps includes an exclusive policy set that mentions a policy of the form prq ) t 2 , and t 3 = a. 
